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CAPEC-672 — Malicious Code Implanted During Chip Programming

provenance: imported · ATT&CK: T1195.003

CAPEC-672: Malicious Code Implanted During Chip Programming

MITRE CAPEC attack pattern

Status Draft
Typical severity High
Likelihood of attack Low
Catalogue CAPEC 3.9 (2023-01-24)

Description

During the programming step of chip manufacture, an adversary with access and necessary technical skills maliciously alters a chip’s intended program logic to produce an effect intended by the adversary when the fully manufactured chip is deployed and in operational use. Intended effects can include the ability of the adversary to remotely control a host system to carry out malicious acts.

Where this sits in the chain

A finding maps to a weakness (CWE), a weakness is exploited by an attack pattern (CAPEC), and an attack pattern shows up in ATT&CK as observed adversary behaviour. This page is the middle hop.

ATT&CK techniques: T1195.003

Prerequisites

  • An adversary would need to have access to a foundry’s or chip maker’s development/production environment where programs for specific chips are developed, managed and uploaded into targeted chips prior to distribution or sale.

Skills required

  • Medium: An adversary needs to be skilled in microprogramming, manipulation of configuration management systems, and in the operation of tools used for the uploading of programs into chips during manufacture. Uploading can be for individual chips or performed on a large scale basis.

Consequences

  • Integrity: Alter Execution Logic

Mitigations

  • Utilize DMEA’s (Defense Microelectronics Activity) Trusted Foundry Program members for acquisition of microelectronic components.
  • Ensure that each supplier performing hardware development implements comprehensive, security-focused configuration management of microcode and microcode generating tools and software.
  • Require that provenance of COTS microelectronic components be known whenever procured.
  • Conduct detailed vendor assessment before acquiring COTS hardware.

Source